QuickDivorce.in<\/a> provides expert support across all jurisdictions in India.<\/p>\n\n\n\nThe Structure of Section 13: How It Is Organised<\/h2>\n\n\n\n Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act operates in two sub-sections:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Section 13(1)<\/strong> lists the grounds available to both husband and wife \u2014 either spouse may petition on these grounds against the other.<\/p>\n\n\n\nSection 13(2)<\/strong> lists additional grounds available exclusively to the wife \u2014 a wife may petition on these grounds against her husband, but the husband has no corresponding right.<\/p>\n\n\n\nUnderstanding this structure is essential because it reflects the legislature’s recognition that wives in certain situations \u2014 polygamy, sexual offences by the husband \u2014 require specific legal protection that the general grounds do not fully address.<\/p>\n\n\n\nSection 13(1): Grounds Available to Both Spouses<\/h2>\n\n\n\nGround 1 \u2014 Adultery: Section 13(1)(i)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n Any marriage may be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party has, after the solemnisation of the marriage, had voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
What adultery means under the HMA:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nAdultery under Section 13(1)(i) requires:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\ud83d\udccb Voluntary sexual intercourse \u2014 not forced, not a result of fraud or incapacity \ud83d\udccb With a person other than the spouse \u2014 the intercourse must be with a third party \ud83d\udccb After the solemnisation of the marriage \u2014 pre-marital conduct, however objectionable, is not adultery under the Act \ud83d\udccb Sexual intercourse specifically \u2014 emotional infidelity, romantic relationships without physical consummation, or non-penetrative intimacy do not technically constitute adultery under this provision (though they may constitute cruelty)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The evidentiary challenge:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nAdultery is, by its nature, conducted in private. Direct evidence \u2014 eyewitness testimony of the act itself \u2014 is almost never available. Courts have therefore consistently held that adultery may be established by circumstantial evidence: the opportunity and inclination, correspondence, photographs, financial transactions indicating a relationship, travel records showing joint travel with a third party, and similar evidence from which the court can draw an inference.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The abolition of Section 497 IPC:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nIn Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2018), the Supreme Court struck down Section 497 of the IPC, which had criminalised adultery. Adultery is no longer a criminal offence in India. However, it remains a ground for civil divorce under Section 13(1)(i). The criminal law change does not affect the matrimonial law position \u2014 an adulterous spouse can still be divorced on this ground even though they cannot be criminally prosecuted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Digital evidence in adultery cases:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nThe Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA) 2023 has significantly modernised rules on digital evidence admissibility. Electronic records, screenshots, and digital communications are now routinely admitted in divorce proceedings. Sections 61\u201365 BSA deal with admissibility of electronic records and digital documents, and Section 39 BSA governs admission of WhatsApp and email conversations as evidence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This development has significantly changed the evidentiary landscape in adultery cases \u2014 text messages, WhatsApp conversations, email chains, and social media interactions that establish the relationship between one spouse and a third party are now admissible as evidence of adultery in divorce proceedings.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ground 2 \u2014 Cruelty: Section 13(1)(ia)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n The other party has, after the solemnisation of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Cruelty is the most commonly pleaded and most litigated ground for contested divorce in India. It is also the ground that has generated the most judicial development \u2014 because the Act does not define cruelty, leaving courts to apply the concept to an infinitely varied range of human conduct.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Physical cruelty:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nPhysical cruelty is the most straightforward form \u2014 assault, violence, bodily harm, inflicting physical injury. Courts have held that even a single act of physical violence of sufficient gravity can constitute cruelty, though in many cases the petitioner establishes a pattern of violence over time. Medical records, police FIR records, hospital discharge summaries, and photographic evidence of injuries are the primary forms of proof in physical cruelty cases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Mental cruelty:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nThe Supreme Court of India has expanded the scope of mental cruelty to reflect modern matrimonial realities. Non-physical conduct causing emotional suffering is now firmly recognised as a valid ground for divorce.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Supreme Court has repeatedly clarified that cruelty includes both physical and mental cruelty. Mental cruelty is more common and harder to prove, but well-recognised in Indian law. The key test is whether living together has become unsafe, unbearable, or harmful.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Conduct recognised as mental cruelty by Indian courts includes:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\ud83d\udccb Persistent false and baseless allegations of infidelity or extramarital relationships \ud83d\udccb Threats of and attempts at suicide \u2014 the Supreme Court has held that unsubstantiated threats of suicide, used as a weapon to control the spouse, constitute mental cruelty \ud83d\udccb Filing false criminal cases \u2014 fabricated Section 498A complaints, false domestic violence allegations, and similar misuse of criminal law \ud83d\udccb Humiliation before family members and in public \ud83d\udccb Wilful refusal of sexual intercourse without reasonable cause (in established cases) \ud83d\udccb Sending vulgar, defamatory letters or notices to the spouse or their employer \ud83d\udccb Persistent demands for dowry or harassment related to dowry \ud83d\udccb Subjecting the spouse to prolonged, multiplied litigation without reasonable basis<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The 2026 Supreme Court ruling on women’s career choices and cruelty:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nThe Supreme Court in May 2026 rebuked lower courts for branding a woman’s career choices as cruelty. The court clarified that a wife’s decision to pursue her career, including relocating for employment, does not constitute cruelty or desertion under the Hindu Marriage Act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This ruling is significant \u2014 it pushes back against a pattern in which lower courts had sometimes treated a wife’s professional independence or employment-related decisions as evidence of her failure of marital obligation, and characterised them as cruelty toward the husband. The Supreme Court’s correction establishes that a spouse’s exercise of their fundamental right to pursue employment cannot be weaponised as a matrimonial offence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Unsubstantiated allegations as the worst form of cruelty:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nThe Supreme Court has held that baseless allegations of unchastity and extra-marital relationships constitute the worst form of cruelty in matrimonial disputes, as they severely harm the reputation and dignity of the spouse. In Nagendra v. K. Meena, the Supreme Court held that baseless and reckless allegations of an extra-marital affair cannot be accepted and can be considered as cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Mental cruelty and separate residence:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nStaying together under the same roof is not a pre-condition for mental cruelty. A spouse can cause mental cruelty by their conduct even while not staying under the same roof. While staying away, a spouse can cause mental cruelty by sending vulgar and defamatory letters or notices or filing complaints containing indecent allegations or by initiating multiple judicial proceedings making the other spouse’s life miserable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The test for cruelty:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nCruelty refers to conduct that makes it unreasonable to expect the petitioner to continue living with the other party. The court applies an objective-subjective test \u2014 it considers the subjective impact of the conduct on the particular petitioner (taking into account their sensitivities, background, and circumstances) while also asking whether a reasonable person in the petitioner’s position would find the conduct intolerable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ground 3 \u2014 Desertion: Section 13(1)(ib)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n The other party has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The four elements of desertion:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nDesertion under the HMA requires the establishment of four elements:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\ud83d\udccb Factum of separation:<\/strong> The deserting spouse has physically separated from the matrimonial home or ceased to cohabit with the petitioner<\/p>\n\n\n\n\ud83d\udccb Animus deserendi (intention to desert):<\/strong> The deserting spouse intended to permanently abandon the matrimonial relationship \u2014 not merely to take a temporary break or travel for a period<\/p>\n\n\n\n\ud83d\udccb Without the petitioner’s consent:<\/strong> The desertion was not agreed to or arranged by the petitioner \u2014 a separation agreed by both parties is not desertion<\/p>\n\n\n\n\ud83d\udccb Without reasonable cause:<\/strong> There was no reasonable justification for the deserting spouse’s departure \u2014 where the petitioner’s own cruelty drove the spouse to leave, the departure is not desertion by the departing spouse<\/p>\n\n\n\nThe two-year period:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nThe desertion must have continued for not less than two years immediately before the petition is filed. “Immediately preceding” is important \u2014 the two years must run up to the date of filing, not be two years at some earlier point. If the parties resumed cohabitation at any point during the two-year period and later separated again, the clock restarts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Constructive desertion:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nCourts have recognised the concept of constructive desertion \u2014 where one spouse, through their own conduct (cruelty, unreasonable behaviour, making cohabitation intolerable), effectively drives the other spouse to leave. In constructive desertion, the spouse who physically leaves is not the deserter \u2014 the spouse whose conduct caused the departure is. This doctrine prevents a spouse from making life so unbearable for their partner that the partner leaves, and then using the partner’s departure as a ground for divorce.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The 2026 Supreme Court ruling on career and desertion:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nThe Supreme Court in 2026 also addressed the question of desertion, clarifying that a wife’s departure for employment in another city does not automatically constitute desertion \u2014 the crucial element of animus deserendi, the intention to permanently abandon the marriage, must be independently established.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ground 4 \u2014 Conversion: Section 13(1)(ii)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n The other party has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Where one spouse converts from Hinduism to another religion \u2014 Islam, Christianity, or any other \u2014 the other spouse acquires the right to divorce. The conversion is itself the ground, without any need to prove that the converted spouse’s conduct has been harmful or unreasonable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The rationale is that the HMA applies only to Hindus, and a conversion out of Hinduism potentially takes the converted spouse outside the Act’s personal law framework, fundamentally altering the legal basis of the marriage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Important:<\/strong> Conversion does not automatically dissolve the marriage \u2014 it creates a ground on which the other spouse may seek dissolution. The non-converted spouse must still file a petition and obtain a decree. A spouse who converts but whose partner does not exercise this ground remains legally married.<\/p>\n\n\n\nGround 5 \u2014 Unsoundness of Mind and Mental Disorder: Section 13(1)(iii)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n The other party has been incurably of unsound mind, or has been suffering continuously or intermittently from mental disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The HMA draws a distinction within this ground:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\ud83d\udccb Incurable unsoundness of mind:<\/strong> A condition of such permanence and severity that the affected spouse is continuously unable to function as a marital partner \u2014 severe psychosis, severe intellectual disability, or other conditions of equivalent gravity<\/p>\n\n\n\n\ud83d\udccb Mental disorder:<\/strong> Suffering from mental disorder continuously or intermittently \u2014 schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, severe personality disorders \u2014 to such a degree that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to continue living with the respondent<\/p>\n\n\n\nThe word “incurable” is significant \u2014 a mental condition that is treatable and responds to treatment does not satisfy this ground. The petitioner must establish medical evidence of the condition’s nature, severity, continuity, and incurability. Psychiatric expert testimony is central to these cases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The standard is not merely that the respondent has a mental illness \u2014 it is that the illness is of such a kind and extent that it makes continued cohabitation unreasonable. Courts apply this standard carefully to avoid stigmatising mental illness or providing an incentive for abandoning spouses with treatable mental health conditions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ground 6 \u2014 Leprosy: Section 13(1)(iv)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n The original Section 13(1)(iv) provided that virulent and incurable leprosy was a ground for divorce. This ground was deleted<\/strong> by the Personal Laws (Amendment) Act, 2019, which removed leprosy as a ground for divorce across multiple personal law statutes. The deletion reflects the medical consensus that leprosy is curable and the social consensus that it should not be the basis for dissolving a marriage.<\/p>\n\n\n\nGround 7 \u2014 Venereal Disease: Section 13(1)(v)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n The original provision relating to venereal disease as a ground for divorce \u2014 specifically virulent communicable venereal disease \u2014 has been subject to significant qualification. Modern jurisprudence treats this ground with caution given advances in the treatment of sexually transmitted infections.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ground 8 \u2014 Renunciation of the World: Section 13(1)(vi)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n A spouse may seek divorce if the other party has renounced the world by entering any religious order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Where one spouse formally renounces the world and enters a religious order \u2014 taking sannyasa or equivalent vows \u2014 the other spouse acquires the right to divorce. The renunciation must be a genuine, formal entry into a religious order involving the abandonment of secular life \u2014 not merely a period of religious practice or spiritual pursuit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ground 9 \u2014 Presumption of Death: Section 13(1)(vii)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n A spouse may seek divorce if the other party has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those who would naturally have heard of the respondent if they had been alive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Where a spouse has not been heard from \u2014 by those who would naturally have been in contact with them \u2014 for seven continuous years, they are presumed dead, and the other spouse may seek a divorce decree on this ground.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The “those who would naturally have heard” standard is important \u2014 the court examines whether the petitioner and the respondent’s family members have made genuine efforts to locate the missing spouse. Wilful disappearance by the respondent to avoid the marriage does not create the presumption of death if the respondent is known to be alive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Section 13(2): Grounds Available to the Wife Only<\/h2>\n\n\n\n Section 13(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act provides additional grounds on which only a wife may petition for divorce. These grounds reflect specific situations \u2014 polygamy and serious sexual offences \u2014 in which the legislature recognised that wives require protection beyond the general grounds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Wife-Only Ground 1 \u2014 Bigamy Before 1955: Section 13(2)(i)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n A wife may seek divorce where the husband had a wife living at the time of their marriage \u2014 that is, where the husband was already married when he married the petitioner, the earlier marriage having been contracted before the commencement of the Hindu Marriage Act (which prohibited bigamy from its commencement in 1955).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This ground covers the historical situation of marriages contracted before the HMA came into force. For marriages contracted after 1955, bigamy is already void under Section 11 of the HMA \u2014 a second marriage in the lifetime of the first spouse is null and void, and the first wife does not need to seek divorce because her marriage has not been legally disturbed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Wife-Only Ground 2 \u2014 Rape, Sodomy, or Bestiality: Section 13(2)(ii)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n Women have an exclusive ground under Section 13(2) of the HMA \u2014 rape, sodomy, or bestiality by the husband. A wife can seek divorce if the husband has, since the solemnisation of the marriage, been guilty of rape, sodomy, or bestiality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This is the provision that allows a wife to obtain a divorce where her husband has committed these acts \u2014 against her or, in the case of rape and sodomy, against other persons. The provision is particularly important in the context of the marital rape debate because it establishes that a husband’s commission of these acts is explicitly recognised by the HMA as a ground for the wife to seek divorce on the basis of cruelty, even though the acts themselves are not criminally prosecutable as rape against the wife under BNS Exception 2.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Section 13(2)(ii) is that the husband has, since the solemnization of the marriage, been guilty of rape, sodomy, or bestiality. These are serious sexual offences, and the law provides the wife with a specific right to seek divorce on this basis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Wife-Only Ground 3 \u2014 Maintenance Order and Non-Cohabitation: Section 13(2)(iii)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n A wife may seek divorce where a decree or order for maintenance has been passed against the husband under Section 125 of the CrPC (now Section 144 of the BNSS) or under the Hindu Marriage Act, and the parties have not resumed cohabitation for one year or more after the passing of the maintenance decree.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The logic is that where a court has already found the husband to have failed in his duty to maintain his wife \u2014 to the extent of passing a maintenance order against him \u2014 and the parties have not reconciled in the year following that order, the wife should not be required to remain in the marriage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Wife-Only Ground 4 \u2014 Option of Puberty: Section 13(2)(iv)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n A wife married before the age of fifteen (with or without her consent) may repudiate the marriage after reaching the age of fifteen but before turning eighteen, and may then petition for divorce on the basis of that repudiation \u2014 provided the marriage was not consummated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This provision \u2014 protecting young girls from being bound by marriages contracted on their behalf as minors \u2014 reflects the same protective philosophy as the Independent Thought v. Union of India (2017) ruling that raised the age in the marital rape exception.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Fault Theory and Its Consequences: The Doctrine of Clean Hands<\/h2>\n\n\n\n Because Section 13(1) is built on the fault theory, the petitioner must come to court with “clean hands” \u2014 they must not themselves be guilty of the same matrimonial offence they are charging against the respondent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
If either of the parties is guilty of committing a matrimonial offence, the aggrieved party alone is entitled to divorce. The party seeking divorce under the matrimonial offence theory must be innocent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The practical consequence:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\ud83d\udccb A husband who has committed adultery cannot petition for divorce on the ground of his wife’s adultery \u2014 the court will refuse the petition on the basis of the husband’s own guilt<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\ud83d\udccb A spouse who has been cruel to their partner cannot petition for divorce on the ground of the partner’s cruelty \u2014 the court will examine the conduct of both parties and may refuse relief if the petitioner’s conduct contributed to or provoked the respondent’s conduct<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\ud83d\udccb A spouse who deserted the other cannot then petition for divorce on the ground of desertion by the other<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Bars to Divorce: When a Valid Ground Is Not Enough<\/h2>\n\n\n\n The HMA provides several bars \u2014 defences available to the respondent \u2014 that can defeat an otherwise validly established ground for divorce. These are governed by Section 23 of the Act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Petitioner’s Own Wrong<\/h3>\n\n\n\n Where the ground for divorce is established but the petitioner has, by their own conduct, contributed to the matrimonial breakdown, the court may \u2014 in its discretion \u2014 refuse to grant the decree.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Condonation<\/h3>\n\n\n\n Where the petitioner, with full knowledge of the matrimonial offence (adultery, cruelty), has forgiven the respondent and resumed normal marital relations, the offence is condoned. A condoned offence cannot be revived as a ground unless the respondent commits the same or a similar offence again. Resumption of sexual intercourse after the offence becomes known is typically treated as condonation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Connivance<\/h3>\n\n\n\n Where the petitioner knowingly allowed or facilitated the respondent’s adultery \u2014 for example, by introducing the respondent to the third party knowing that a relationship might develop \u2014 the petitioner is conniving and cannot rely on the adultery as a ground for divorce.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Collusion<\/h3>\n\n\n\n Where both parties have colluded to manufacture or fabricate evidence of a matrimonial offence to obtain a divorce decree \u2014 essentially using the contested divorce as a form of arranged mutual divorce without meeting the Section 13B requirements \u2014 the court will refuse the decree.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage: The Article 142 Doctrine<\/h2>\n\n\n\n Section 13 does not recognise irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for divorce. A spouse who finds the marriage completely broken, but cannot establish any of the specific fault-based grounds in Section 13(1), cannot obtain a divorce on the mere basis of the marriage’s failure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, the Supreme Court has consistently recognised irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground under Article 142, even though statutory recognition under HMA is still pending in 2026. Parties may petition directly before the Supreme Court in exceptional cases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Neither the civil courts nor even the High Courts can pass orders on grounds not provided for in Section 13 and 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act. The Supreme Court can, in exercise of its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, convert a proceeding under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act into one under Section 13-B and pass a decree for mutual divorce without waiting for the statutory period of six months, but none of the other courts can exercise such powers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Article 142 doctrine means that the Supreme Court \u2014 and only the Supreme Court \u2014 can dissolve a marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown even where no specific fault-based ground has been established. Family Courts and High Courts do not have this power. For the vast majority of divorce petitioners who appear before Family Courts and High Courts, the fault-based grounds of Section 13 remain the only available statutory routes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Contested Divorce Process: A Brief Overview<\/h2>\n\n\n\n Understanding the grounds is the first step. The process of establishing those grounds before a Family Court involves:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\ud83d\udccb Filing the petition:<\/strong> The divorce petition under Section 13 must be filed before the Family Court (or District Court where no Family Court exists) having territorial jurisdiction \u2014 the place where the marriage was solemnised, where the parties last lived together, or where the respondent resides<\/p>\n\n\n\n\ud83d\udccb Service of summons:<\/strong> The court issues summons to the respondent. If the respondent is evading service, substituted service (newspaper publication) may be ordered.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\ud83d\udccb Written statement:<\/strong> The respondent files a written statement contesting the grounds \u2014 or, if the respondent does not appear, the court may proceed ex-parte<\/p>\n\n\n\n\ud83d\udccb Evidence stage:<\/strong> Both parties file affidavits of evidence (examination-in-chief) and cross-examine each other’s witnesses. This is the most time-consuming phase of contested divorce.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\ud83d\udccb Final arguments:<\/strong> Counsel for both parties argue the case on facts and law<\/p>\n\n\n\n\ud83d\udccb Decree or dismissal:<\/strong> The court passes a decree of divorce if the ground is proved, or dismisses the petition if it is not<\/p>\n\n\n\nThe timeline for a contested divorce in India ranges from three to seven years in most Family Courts, depending on the court’s case load, the complexity of the issues, and whether the respondent actively contests the petition or simply fails to appear.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Using Digital Evidence in Contested Divorce Cases<\/h2>\n\n\n\n Cyber harassment by a spouse \u2014 threatening messages, defamatory social media posts \u2014 can constitute mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia). The admissibility of digital evidence under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 has opened significant new avenues for petitioners who have documented the respondent’s conduct through digital channels:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\ud83d\udccb WhatsApp conversations and call records establishing conduct constituting cruelty \ud83d\udccb Email communications demonstrating adultery or an adulterous relationship \ud83d\udccb Social media posts and photographs establishing the respondent’s relationship with a third party \ud83d\udccb GPS location data establishing the respondent’s presence at certain locations \ud83d\udccb Bank transaction records revealing financial conduct constituting cruelty (dissipation of joint assets, financial abuse) \ud83d\udccb Screen-recorded video evidence of video calls where threats or abusive conduct occurred<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For digital evidence to be admissible, it must be accompanied by a certificate under Section 63 of the BSA 2023 \u2014 a certification that the electronic record was produced by the device, in the manner described, and that the device was functioning normally. Courts are increasingly familiar with this requirement, and advocates handling divorce cases must ensure that digital evidence is prepared and certified correctly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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